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IMPORTANT IS NOT IMPORTANT ENOUGH:
FORCIBLY MEDICATING DEFENDANTS
FOR SENTENCING USING THE IMPORTANT
INTEREST STANDARD
SARAH VIEBROCK†
INTRODUCTION
Consider the following hypothetical. Jack is convicted of a
felony in federal court. Jack suffers from a mental illness.
Shortly after his conviction, Jack starts hearing voices in his
head. Jack begins acting and feeling strange. Jack does not
want to take medication, and of course he has the right to refuse
to do so. Jack’s sentencing hearing is scheduled for next month,
but the court worries that Jack may not be fit to continue with
sentencing based on his recent behavior. As a result, the court
orders a hearing pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4241 to determine if
Jack is presently suffering from a mental disease or defect
rendering him incompetent to proceed with sentencing.
At the hearing, the court finds by a preponderance of the
evidence that Jack is presently suffering from a mental disease
or defect and is incompetent to proceed with sentencing.1 Once
deemed incompetent, Jack is hospitalized in a suitable facility
After several months, it
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d).2
appears unlikely that Jack will regain competency for

†
Notes and Comments Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D., magna cum laude,
2016, St. John’s University School of Law.
1
Competency requires that the defendant “understand the nature and
consequences of the proceedings against him” and be able to participate in them.
18 U.S.C. § 4241 (2012); see also United States v. Dreyer, 705 F.3d 951, 961 (9th Cir.
2013); Chavez v. United States, 656 F.2d 512, 518 (9th Cir. 1981). The competency
statute was initially enacted in 1948 and was substantially revised in 1984 as part of
an attempt to afford more protection to mentally ill defendants within the criminal
law. 18 U.S.C. § 4241 (2012); H.R. REP. NO. 81-1319, at 1 (1949).
2
This statute allows a court to hospitalize a defendant for treatment following a
determination that the defendant is presently suffering a mental disease or defect
rendering him incompetent to proceed with the proceedings against him.
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sentencing. The court is ready to provisionally sentence Jack
under 18 U.S.C. § 4244(d) to a suitable facility for care or
treatment until he regains competency or serves out the
maximum term authorized for his crime.3 But the Government
steps in, arguing that it has an important interest in sentencing
Jack, and thus it should be permitted to forcibly medicate him in
order to restore his competency. Jack objects. He does not want
to be medicated, and he believes he has the right not to be
medicated.
There are several invaluable rights at stake for Jack. First,
he has a right to be free from unwarranted bodily intrusion.4
Forcible medication would violate this right with no
repercussions to the wrongdoer. Second, through the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, Jack
has a protected liberty interest in avoiding forcible medication of
antipsychotic drugs.5 Third, he has a constitutional right under
the First Amendment to freedom of speech and thought.6 Fourth,
Jack has a fundamental right to privacy, and forcible medication
would interfere with this right.7
Nevertheless, the Government argues that its important
interest in sentencing Jack outweighs these significant
individual rights. The court agrees. Jack is held down, sedated,
and injected with antipsychotic medication. The court proceeds
to sentence him.

3
This provision provides the court with a sentencing alternative for a defendant
suffering from a mental disease or defect.
4
Greater N.Y. Health Care Facilities Ass'n, Inc. v. Axelrod, 770 F. Supp. 183,
187 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (“The Constitution does provide protection against unwanted
bodily intrusion.”); United States v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479, 490 (4th Cir. 1987)
(“Forcible medication with antipsychotic drugs implicates individual rights to
freedom from physical invasion . . . as well as the right to privacy protected by the
Constitution and the common law.”).
5
U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. This right is recognized
in all Supreme Court cases dealing with the issue of forcible medication. Sell v.
United States, 539 U.S. 166, 183 (2003); Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 133–34
(1992); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221–22 (1990).
6
Charters, 829 F.2d at 492 (“Such mind altering medication has the potential to
allow the government to alter or control thinking and thereby to destroy the
independence of thought and speech so crucial to a free society.”).
7
Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387, 1393 (10th Cir. 1984) (“[T]he decision whether
to accept treatment with antipsychotic drugs is of sufficient importance to fall within
this category of privacy interests protected by the Constitution.”).
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The Government is able to step in and forcibly medicate Jack
because of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Sell v.
United States.8 In Sell, the Court created a four-part factors test,
which, if established by the Government, allows the Government
to forcibly medicate a defendant for the sole purpose of regaining
competency for trial.9 Recently, the Sell factors test has been
extended to apply in situations where the Government is seeking
to forcibly medicate a defendant for sentencing as opposed to
trial.10 This Note specifically focuses on the first factor of the Sell
test, which requires that the Government demonstrate an
important interest in forcibly medicating the defendant in order
to proceed.11 This is the only factor that is purely a matter of law
to be decided by the court.12 The other three factors include:
(1) that the involuntary medication will significantly further the
Government’s interests, (2) that the medication is necessary to
further those interests, and (3) that administration of the drugs
is medically appropriate.13 These three factors are largely
dependent on the factual circumstances of individual cases.14
While it is well established that the Government may have an
important interest in forcibly medicating a defendant for trial,15
only two lower courts have addressed the Government’s interest
in forcibly medicating a defendant for sentencing.16
This Note analyzes whether the Government’s interest in
sentencing is the same as its interest in trial, and whether the
“important interest” standard is a high enough threshold for the
Government when it seeks to forcibly medicate a defendant for
sentencing.17 This Note will conclude that because of the
8

539 U.S. 166.
Id. at 180–81.
10
United States v. Baldovinos, 434 F.3d 233, 240–41 (4th Cir. 2006).
11
Sell, 539 U.S. at 180.
12
United States v. Grape, 549 F.3d 591, 598 (3rd Cir. 2008).
13
Sell, 539 U.S. at 181.
14
Grape, 549 F.3d at 598 (applying a clear error standard of review to factors
two through four because of their factual nature).
15
See United States v. Mikulich, 732 F.3d 692, 696 (6th Cir. 2013); United
States v. Fazio, 599 F.3d 835, 839 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. Renshaw, No.
4:06CR-31-M., 2007 WL 2746675, at *1 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 18, 2007).
16
United States v. Cruz, 757 F.3d 372, 383 (3rd Cir. 2014); United States v.
Wood, 459 F. Supp. 2d 451, 457–58 (E.D. Va. 2006).
17
This Note does not specifically explore the extension of the other three factors
to the sentencing phase, but rather discusses how they help or harm the argument
that the important interest standard is the appropriate threshold for the
Government when it seeks to forcibly medicate a defendant for sentencing.
9
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procedural alternatives to forcible medication at sentencing, the
functional differences between trial and sentencing, and the
spirit of the Supreme Court’s decision in Sell, the Government
should be required to demonstrate a compelling, rather than an
important, interest when it seeks to forcibly medicate a
defendant for sentencing.
Part I discusses the evolution of allowing a defendant to be
forcibly medicated in order to withstand trial. Part II discusses
how this concept was extended to apply in situations where the
Government seeks to forcibly medicate a defendant for
sentencing. Part III analyzes the arguments supporting the
proposition that the Government’s interest in forcibly medicating
a defendant for trial is essentially the same as its interest in
sentencing. Part IV presents the arguments as to why the
Government’s interest in forcibly medicating a defendant for
sentencing is different than its interest in forcibly medicating a
defendant for trial.
Finally, Part V discusses why these
differences call for a heightened standard when the Government
seeks to forcibly medicate a defendant for sentencing as opposed
to trial, and the practical effect of that heightened standard.
I.
A.

BACKGROUND

The Initial Allowance of Forcible Medication to Dangerous
Defendants

The conflict between individual rights and the state’s
interest in forcible medication first arose in a case involving a
mentally ill prisoner who was a danger to himself and to others.
In Washington v. Harper,18 the United States Supreme Court
addressed the issue of “whether a judicial hearing is required
before the State may treat a mentally ill prisoner with
antipsychotic drugs against his will.”19 At the time of this
decision, Washington state policy allowed inmates to be forcibly
medicated pursuant to prison policy if certain conditions were
met.20 Defendant Harper had been sentenced to prison for
18

494 U.S. 210 (1990).
Id. at 213.
20
Id. at 215–16. In order to be forcibly medicated the inmate must first “suffer[]
from a ‘mental disorder’ and . . . [be] ‘gravely disabled’ or pose[] a ‘likelihood of
serious harm’ to himself, others, or their property.” Id. at 215 (footnote omitted). The
inmate is entitled to a hearing before a committee who determines if those
19
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robbery and spent most of his incarceration housed in a mental
health unit where, at first, he consented to administration of
antipsychotic medication.21 Harper was eventually paroled on
the condition that he continue to receive treatment.22 One year
later, Harper assaulted two nurses, and his parole was revoked.23
Upon his return to prison, he was diagnosed with manicdepressive disorder but refused treatment.24 As a result, the
treating physician sought to medicate Harper over his objections
pursuant to prison policy.25 An administrative hearing was
conducted, and the committee found that involuntary medication
was appropriate.26
Harper eventually filed suit under 42 U.S.C § 1983, claiming
that the failure to provide a judicial hearing before involuntary
administration of antipsychotic medication violated both
Substantive and Procedural Due Process, Equal Protection, and
the Free Speech Clauses of both state and federal constitutions.27
The lower court held that even considering Harper’s liberty
interest, the procedures governing involuntary administration of
antipsychotic medication met the requirements of due process.28
The Washington Supreme Court reversed and remanded the
case, holding that the “highly intrusive nature” of the treatment
in this case required the state to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the “medication was both necessary and effective
for furthering a compelling state interest.”29 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari and reversed, holding that, “given the
requirements of the prison environment, the Due Process Clause
permits the State to treat a prison inmate who has a serious
mental illness with antipsychotic drugs against his will, if the
inmate is dangerous to himself or others and the treatment is in
the inmate’s medical interest.”30 Thus, the Supreme Court held
requirements are met. Id. The inmate also has “certain procedural rights before,
during, and after the hearing.” Id. at 216. This “involuntary medication can continue
only with periodic review.” Id.
21
Id. at 213.
22
Id. at 214.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Id. at 217.
27
Id.
28
Id. at 217–18.
29
Id. at 218.
30
Id. at 227.
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that the state’s policy was permissible under the Constitution
because it balanced the inmate’s liberty interest in being free
from forced administration of antipsychotic drugs and the state’s
interest in providing treatment to an inmate who is a danger to
himself and others.31
The Supreme Court revisited the balancing of these interests
two years later in Riggins v. Nevada,32 this time finding that the
state’s interests were not essential enough to allow forcible
medication of a pre-trial detainee.33 In Riggins, defendant
Riggins was awaiting his trial for murder and robbery charges
when a psychiatrist prescribed him medication to help with the
voices he was hearing and his sleeping problems.34 The lower
court conducted a hearing and determined that Riggins was
competent to withstand trial.35 Shortly thereafter, Riggins
sought to suspend his medication until after his trial, arguing
that the medication would alter the way the jury saw him and
thus might negatively impact his insanity defense.36 After an
evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied Riggins’s motion.37 He
pursued the insanity defense but was convicted and sentenced to
death.38 Riggins then challenged his conviction, arguing that his

31

Id. at 236.
504 U.S. 127 (1992).
33
Id. at 138.
34
Id. at 129.
35
Id. at 129–30. Three court-appointed psychiatrists performed examinations of
Riggins while he was taking daily antipsychotic medication. Id. Two out of the three
doctors found Riggins competent to withstand trial. Id. at 130.
36
Id.
37
Id. at 130–31. The district court heard testimony from the treating
physicians. Id. One doctor “guess[ed]” that taking Riggins off medication would not
render him incompetent to withstand trial and would not lead to a noticeable change
in his behavior. Id. at 130 (alteration in original). Another doctor opined that
Riggins would be competent without the medication, but that the jurors would not
notice the effects of the medication. Id. A third doctor was unable to predict what
would happen if Riggins went off his medication, but questioned if Riggins really
needed the high dose he was receiving. Id. at 131. The doctor who previously found
Riggins incompetent also submitted a written report, holding to his earlier opinion
and expressing concern about what would happen if Riggins was taken off
medication. Id. The decision to deny the motion was one page long and did not
indicate the court’s rationale. Id.
38
Id.
32
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constitutional rights were violated when he was forced to take
drugs, and that these drugs “denied him the ability to assist in
his own defense and prejudicially affected his attitude,
appearance, and demeanor at trial.”39
The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed Riggins’s convictions,
holding that the forcible medication did not violate his trial
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide
rights.40
whether Riggins’s trial rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments were violated.41 The Court held that “[b]ecause the
record contains no finding that might support a conclusion that
administration of antipsychotic medication was necessary to
accomplish an essential state policy . . . we have no basis for
saying that the substantial probability of trial prejudice in this
case was justified.”42
In other words, the Court was not
convinced that the state had met its burden in showing that the
treatment was medically appropriate and essential for the sake
of Riggins’s own safety or the safety of others.43 The Riggins
Court reiterated that an individual has an important liberty
interest in remaining free from unwanted administration of
antipsychotic drugs, and that only an essential state interest
could override this liberty interest.44
B.

The Sell Test: Forcibly Medicating Defendants for Trial
Purposes

The concept of balancing the liberty interests of the
defendant against an important state interest set the stage for
the Court’s opinion in Sell v. United States.45 Charles Sell was a
practicing dentist and had a long history of mental illness.46 On
multiple occasions, Sell was hospitalized and treated with
antipsychotic medications for reasons not involving criminal

39
Id. Riggins argued that this prejudice was not justified because the state did
not demonstrate a need to administer the drugs, and it did not explore alternatives
to the medication. Id.
40
Id. at 132. The court held that the expert testimony sufficiently informed the
jurors about the effects of the medication, and thus the lower court did not abuse its
discretion or violate Riggins’s trial rights. Id.
41
Id. at 132–33.
42
Id. at 138.
43
Id. at 135.
44
Id. at 136.
45
539 U.S. 166, 167 (2003).
46
Id. at 169.
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activity.47 Sell was charged with fifty-six counts of mail fraud,
six counts of Medicaid fraud, and one count of money
laundering.48 A Magistrate Judge, aware of Sell’s psychotic
breaks, found Sell “currently competent,” and released him on
bail.49
However, the Magistrate Judge later held a bail
revocation hearing as a result of the Government’s claim that
Sell had sought to intimidate a witness.50 Sell’s outlandish
behavior, a psychiatrist’s report, and other testimony at the
hearing led the Magistrate Judge to revoke Sell’s bail.51 Later
that year, a new indictment was issued charging Sell with
attempting to murder the FBI agent who arrested him and a
former employee who planned to be a witness in the fraud case.52
These charges were combined with the fraud charges for trial
purposes.53
Thereafter, Sell sought reconsideration of his competency to
stand trial.54 After an examination at the United States Medical
Center for Federal Prisoners (“Medical Center”), the Magistrate
Judge determined Sell was incompetent to stand trial and
ordered that he be hospitalized for treatment for up to four
months in order to determine the probability that Sell would ever
regain competency for trial.55 Two months into his stay, Sell
began refusing the staff’s recommendation that he take
antipsychotic medication.56 The center then “sought permission
to administer the medication against Sell’s will.”57
The decision to forcibly medicate Sell was first made by a
reviewing physician who considered, among other things, Sell’s
prior history, his current state, and additional medical opinions.58
47

Id. at 169–70.
Id. at 170.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id. at 171.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id. Some examples of the type of information the physician took into account
include: Sell’s belief that the Government was trying to suppress his knowledge
about certain events and silence him, medical opinions that pointed to a diagnosis of
a Delusional Disorder with underlying Schizophrenic Process, medical concerns
about the persistence of his government conspiracy belief, and Sell’s own view that
he did not suffer from mental illness. Id.
48
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The physician authorized the administration of the medication
because Sell was mentally ill and dangerous, and the medication
would help render him competent to stand trial.59 Next, the
Medical Center administratively reviewed this decision, reviewed
the evidence, and upheld the physician’s decision.60 Soon after,
Sell challenged the Medical Center’s right to forcibly medicate
him.61 The Magistrate Judge reviewed the evidence, agreed with
the Medical Center’s opinion, and issued an order authorizing the
center to administer the medication to Sell against his will.62
The district court reviewed the Magistrate Judge’s decision and
held that the finding that Sell was a danger to himself and others
was “clearly erroneous.”63 Nevertheless, the district court upheld
the Magistrate’s Order allowing involuntary administration of
the drugs for the sole purpose of rendering the defendant
competent for trial.64 Both parties appealed, and the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the
district court’s judgment.65
The Supreme Court granted
59

Id. at 171–72.
Id. at 172.
61
Id.
62
Id. at 172−73. The Magistrate Judge based his finding of dangerousness on
the defendant’s belief that everyone is out to get him—arguing it increases the
likelihood that he will try to protect himself by being violent towards others—the
violent nature of Sell’s offenses, the defendant’s alleged infatuation with a nurse,
and his animosity towards the prison psychologist. United States v. Sell, No. 4:97
CR 290 DJS, 4:98 CR 177 DJS, 2001 WL 35838455, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 4, 2001),
aff'd, 282 F.3d 560 (8th Cir. 2002), vacated, 539 U.S. 166 (2003).
63
Sell, 539 U.S. at 173−74. A district court judge can reconsider any pretrial
matter decided by a Magistrate Judge where that order has been shown to be
completely erroneous or contrary to law. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) (2012). Here, the
district court held the finding of dangerousness to be clearly erroneous because the
record did not indicate the defendant “posed a danger to himself or others during the
period of his institutionalization at the USMC, and the statements and conduct
relied upon for a finding of dangerousness do not suggest a threat of violence to the
staff.” Sell, 2001 WL 35838455, at *5.
64
Sell, 2001 WL 35838455, at *8. The court based its decision on three findings.
Id. These findings were that the drugs were medically appropriate for the defendant,
that they were the only viable hope of rendering the defendant competent for trial,
and that the drugs appeared to be necessary to serve the Government’s compelling
interest in bringing the defendant to trial. Id.
65
Sell, 539 U.S. at 174. Sell asked the Eighth Circuit to decide whether the
lower court erred in holding that he could be forcibly medicated for the sole purpose
of restoring his competency for trial. United States v. Sell, 282 F.3d 560, 565 (8th
Cir. 2002). He also asked whether the lower court applied the correct standard of
review, whether it properly considered his Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial,
60
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certiorari to determine whether the Government can forcibly
medicate a defendant solely to render him competent to stand
trial for nonviolent offenses.66
Unlike Harper and Riggins, the Sell Court was forced to
address the issue of involuntary medication solely for trial
competence purposes, leaving aside the dangerousness of the
defendant, and the violent nature of the defendant’s crime.67 The
Sell Court discussed the tensions at play, reiterating the
defendant’s liberty interest in remaining free from unwanted
medications and the state’s possible interest in rendering the
defendant competent.68 Considering these competing interests,
the Sell Court dictated a factors test to be used in order to
determine whether drugs may be administered involuntarily
solely for the purpose of trial: (1) there must be an important
Government interest at stake; (2) the court must conclude that
involuntary medication will significantly further those interests;
(3) the involuntary administration of medication must be
necessary to further the important interest at stake; and
(4) administration of the drugs must be medically appropriate.69
The rationale behind this test was to confine forcible medication
for trial competence to very rare circumstances in order to
preserve the important liberty interest an individual has in
remaining free from unwanted medication.70
Ultimately, the Sell Court determined that the court of
appeals erred in its decision to allow forcible medication of Sell
solely to render him competent to stand trial because the four
factors were not met.71 First, the Court stated that the lower
courts, as well as the expert witnesses, focused on the
dangerousness issue rather than trial competence.72 As a result,
important questions about trial-related side effects and risks
were not asked or answered.73 Thus, the Court was unable to
and whether the Government proved by clear and convincing evidence that the
medication was appropriate and would likely restore his competency. Id. The
Government argued that the lower court did not err on those grounds, and that the
district court’s finding that Sell was not dangerous was erroneous. Id.
66
Sell, 539 U.S. at 175.
67
Id.
68
Id. at 177.
69
Id. at 180−81.
70
Id. at 180.
71
Id. at 186.
72
Id. at 185.
73
Id.
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conclude whether Sell would be prejudiced and whether his trial
rights would be violated by the forcible medication.74
Additionally, the lower courts did not consider the amount of
time Sell had already spent confined, and that his refusal to take
the medication “might result in further lengthy confinement.”75
Those two factors could possibly mitigate the importance of the
Consequently, the
governmental interest in prosecution.76
Supreme Court held that Sell’s forcible medication could not
stand.77 Despite this particular outcome, the Sell test has
become the standard for determining the constitutionality of
forcibly medicating a defendant for trial.78
II. FORCIBLY MEDICATING DEFENDANTS FOR SENTENCING
A.

An Issue of First Impression: Extending the Sell Factors to
Sentencing

While the Sell test is consistently used to determine whether
a nondangerous defendant can be forcibly medicated for trial,
there remains an unanswered question: whether the same
analysis governs a situation in which the Government seeks to
forcibly medicate a defendant for sentencing. Recently, several
lower courts have been faced with this issue of first impression
and have attempted to answer it.
In 2006, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
extended the Sell test to apply to situations where the
Government seeks to forcibly medicate the defendant for
sentencing.79 In United States v. Baldovinos,80 the court used the
Sell test to determine whether the defendant’s sentence should
be vacated because he was involuntarily medicated with
antipsychotic drugs in order to regain competency for
sentencing.81 Baldovinos’s mental health problems began after
he had already been convicted at trial and before his sentencing
hearing.82 Due to his troubling behavior on several occasions,
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82

Id. at 185–86.
Id. at 186.
Id.
Id.
United States v. Grape, 549 F.3d 591, 598 (3rd Cir. 2008).
United States v. Baldovinos, 434 F.3d 233, 238–39 (4th Cir. 2006).
434 F.3d 233.
Id. at 240–41.
Id. at 235–36.
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Baldovinos was treated with short-acting antipsychotic
medication.83 The treating physicians ultimately determined
that Baldovinos was not competent to be sentenced, but they
believed that they could render him competent with medication.84
The district court agreed with the treating physicians’ report and
thus extended his commitment period for continued treatment.85
Sixteen months later, the physicians determined Baldovinos was
competent to be sentenced.86 In those sixteen months, the
physicians changed his diagnoses twice and altered the type and
Based on the
amount of his medication several times.87
physicians’ recommendation, the court proceeded to sentence
Baldovinos to a total term of 120 months in prison.88 Baldovinos
appealed, arguing that his sentence should be vacated due to the
fact that he was medicated against his will.89
The court used the Sell principles in its analysis as opposed
to weighing the defendant’s liberty interests against the state’s
interest in protecting the defendant and others from danger, like
in Harper. The court’s rationale was that “the Government’s
overriding purpose in medicating Baldovinos was to render him
mentally competent to be sentenced,” not to address his
dangerousness.90 The court acknowledged that it was unresolved
whether the Sell principles allow the Government to forcibly
medicate the defendant for sentencing, but did not address this
issue directly.91 The Government conceded that, under the Sell
principles, the district court plainly erred92 by allowing
Baldovinos to be forcibly medicated, but urged the court not to
recognize the error because those involved medicated him in good
faith, believing medication was in his best interest.93 The court
83
Id. at 236. Specifically, Baldovinos was seen in the fetal position on the floor
under the bed, and would alternatively remain crouched for several hours in a
corner of his room or in the shower. Id. He would not respond to the staff, and when
he was touched by the staff, he would become upset and appeared frightened. Id. He
ate little food and he soiled himself, but “resisted staff members’ efforts to move and
clean him.” Id.
84
Id. at 236.
85
Id. at 237.
86
Id. at 238.
87
Id. at 237–38.
88
Id. at 238.
89
Id. at 238–39.
90
Id. at 241.
91
Id. at 243 n.7.
92
Id. at 239.
93
Id. at 242.
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declined to recognize any plain error that occurred, but not based
on the Government’s good faith argument.94 It reasoned that
Baldovinos had already been medicated and it could not undo
that.95 Moreover, since Baldovinos had received the minimum
sentence for his crimes, the court was unable to conclude “any
error in medicating Baldovinos against his will seriously affected
the ‘fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.’ ”96 Thus, the court did not engage in a full analysis
of the Sell factors test as applied to Baldovinos.
Similarly, later that same year, a Virginia district court
followed the Baldovinos court’s determination that the Sell
factors apply in the sentencing context.97 In United States v.
Wood,98 defendant John Wood had a long history of mental illness
and was often going on and off his medication.99 Wood pled guilty
to making false bomb threats by telephone.100 The court found
that his guilty plea was knowing and voluntary, but grappled
with the issue of whether Mr. Wood could be involuntarily
Both parties agreed that the
medicated for sentencing.101
defendant should be forcibly medicated, but disagreed as to
whether he should be sentenced or provisionally sentenced once
the medicating took place.102
For the first time, a court considered each of the factors laid
out by the Sell Court in the sentencing context.103 First, the court
held that the Government had an important interest in forcibly
medicating the defendant for sentencing “because doing so
furthers Congress’ goal that the sentence a defendant receives
should accurately reflect the real nature of his offense, and
should be tailored to the defendant’s circumstances.”104 In

94

Id. at 243.
Id. at 242.
96
Id. at 243 (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736 (1993)).
97
United States v. Wood, 459 F. Supp. 2d 451, 456–57 (E.D. Va. 2006).
98
459 F. Supp. 2d 451.
99
Id. at 453–55.
100
Id. at 454.
101
Id. at 454–55.
102
Id. at 455. The defendant asserted that forcible medication should be ordered
to restore the defendant to competence and proceed with sentencing. Id. The
Government argued that the defendant should be provisionally sentenced under
18 U.S.C. § 4244(d) with a view towards restoring competency, and the sentencing
could be revisited once competency is restored. Id.
103
Id. at 456–57.
104
Id. at 458.
95
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support of this holding, the court discussed Congress’s enactment
of the Federal Sentencing Act and the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, which were aimed at achieving “similar relationships
between sentences and real conduct.”105 Stressing Congress’s
intention, the court held that sentencing a defendant is a critical
step in achieving these goals, and thus the Government had an
important interest.106
Second, the court found by clear and convincing evidence
that the medication was substantially likely to render the
defendant competent, and that it was substantially likely that
the medication’s side effects would not substantially interfere
with his ability to assist counsel in the proceeding.107 Third, the
court found involuntary administration of medication to be
necessary, and that there were no less intrusive alternatives due
to Mr. Wood’s reluctance to comply with treatment plans and
inability to recognize his mental disease.108 Fourth and finally,
the court found the administration of medication to be medically
appropriate based on Mr. Wood’s medical history, and the
treatment of his mental illness in general.109 Following this
analysis, the court granted the Government’s request that Mr.
Wood be forcibly medicated in order to render him competent for
sentencing, but denied the Government’s request that Mr. Wood
be provisionally sentenced.110
B.

Finding a Governmental Interest in Forcibly Medicating for
Sentencing

The above line of cases influenced the recent decision in
United States v. Cruz,111 where the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit confronted a matter of first

105

Id. (quoting United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 253–54 (2005)).
Id. at 458–59. The court also concluded that there were no special
circumstances in this case that made the Government’s interest “less exigent.” Id. at
459.
107
Id. at 460.
108
Id. at 461.
109
Id. The court stated that the proposed medical regimen appeared unlikely to
harm Mr. Wood since he does not have any underlying medical conditions that
would caution the use of antipsychotic medication. Id. Additionally, the court used
evidence that early treatment of schizophrenia improves chances of recovery, and
that the disease worsens if untreated. Id.
110
Id. at 462.
111
757 F.3d 372 (3d Cir. 2014).
106
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impression.112 The issue was “whether the Government . . . can
have a sufficiently important interest in forcibly medicating a
defendant to restore his mental competency and render him fit to
proceed with sentencing.”113 Defendant Cruz was found guilty of
two counts of threatening a federal law enforcement officer, but
before the sentencing hearing could take place, the Government
expressed concerns about his competency.114 The district court
found Cruz to be incompetent and thus did not proceed with
sentencing.115 Cruz continued to refuse medication, and the
Government sought approval to have Cruz medicated against his
will.116 Using the Sell criteria as a basis for its analysis, the
district court found that the four Sell factors were sufficiently
satisfied and ordered defendant’s forcible medication.117
Cruz moved for a stay of the district court’s order,
specifically challenging the court’s finding in regard to the first
factor of the Sell test: the finding of an important interest.118 The
district court cited Wood and argued that the Government had an
important interest in making sure the defendant’s sentence
adequately reflects his crime and the circumstances.119 In
addition, the district court found that there were no special
circumstances that would lessen the Government’s interest.120
On appeal, Cruz raised several arguments to demonstrate that
this first factor of the Sell test was not adequately met.121 He
argued that the Government’s interest is lessened because the
intent is to restore his competency for sentencing, as opposed to a
trial.122 Cruz further argued that the likelihood of him being
civilly committed constitutes a special circumstance that lessens
the Government’s interest.123
112

Id. at 374.
Id.
114
Id.
115
Id.
116
Id. at 375.
117
Id. at 376.
118
Id. at 377.
119
Id. at 376.
120
Id.
121
Id. at 377–78.
122
Id. at 378.
123
Id. Cruz also argued that his crimes are less violent than precedent cases,
and that the court’s dependence on the presentence report was misplaced. Id. Those
arguments are not relevant to this analysis. Civil commitment is authorized for
persons whose sentence is about to expire, or who have been committed to the
custody of the Attorney General pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d), or for persons
113
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The court of appeals reviewed for plain error and found that
the district court did not plainly err in finding an important
Government interest.124 The court found the Wood court’s
rationale highly persuasive and reiterated the idea that the
Government has an important interest in formal sentencing
procedures in order to achieve uniformity.125 Additionally, the
Cruz court addressed the argument that sentencing proceedings
should be differentiated from the trial phase because of the Sell
court’s emphasis on the “pre-trial nature of the proceedings.”126
The court responded that the sentencing phase of prosecution has
similar procedural concerns127 to those at the trial phase, and
thus the Government’s interest is just as important at sentencing
as it is at trial.128 Further, the Cruz court rejected the argument
that the court’s ability to provisionally sentence undermines the
Government’s interest, arguing that provisional sentences cannot
bring finality to a criminal case the same way sentencing
proceedings can.129 Finally, the court reasoned that Cruz’s
crimes were serious enough to create a governmental interest in
preserving “human security.”130 For these reasons, the court of
appeals affirmed the order of the district court.131
III. THE GOVERNMENT’S IMPORTANT INTEREST IN SENTENCING A
DEFENDANT
In Sell, the United States Supreme Court held that the
Government may have an important interest in forcibly
medicating a defendant for trial.132 The reasoning of the Sell
Court rested on the procedural aspects of a trial, such as
presentation of evidence and witness testimony, as well as the

against whom criminal charges have been dismissed as a result of a mental
condition if the release of such person would create a substantial risk of bodily injury
to another person or serious damage to property. 18 U.S.C. § 4241 (2006). Cruz
argued that his dangerous behavior was likely to result in civil commitment, but the
court of appeals did not agree. Cruz, 757 F.3d at 378.
124
Id. at 389.
125
Id. at 384.
126
Id. at 384–85.
127
These concerns include memories fading and evidence lost. Id. at 385–86.
128
Id. at 385.
129
Id.
130
Id. at 387.
131
Id. at 389.
132
Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 180 (2003).
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purposes behind having a trial.133 There are several arguments
to be made that the procedural and substantive aspects of
sentencing proceedings are no less important to the Government.
These arguments provide some support for the use of the
important interest standard as the first factor for seeking to
forcibly medicate defendants for sentencing, but are
unconvincing.
First, similar to the Government’s interest in timely
prosecution, the Government has an interest in a timely
sentencing procedure.134 There are two main reasons why the
Government has an interest in speedy sentencing. The first
reason is concern about memories fading and losing evidence.135
As expressed by the Cruz court, this concern “applies with equal
force to both the jury’s determination of a defendant’s guilt and
the court’s sentencing determinations.”136 This is because, like in
trial, it may be hard to conduct a fair sentencing hearing without
prejudice to the defendant if memories have faded and evidence
is lost, since the court largely depends on a presentence report.137
There are many fact-finding procedures in a sentencing, and it is
beneficial to the court and to the defendant if memories of these
facts are fresh since they will greatly influence the defendant’s
sentence.138
The second reason rests on the idea of judicial efficiency.139
One can never be certain if or when an incompetent person is
suddenly going to be competent again.140 As a result, it may be
133

Id.
Cruz, 757 F.3d at 384–86.
135
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532 (1972). Prejudice to the defendant is the
fourth and most serious factor in determining whether a defendant’s right to a
speedy trial has been violated because a defendant must be able to adequately
prepare his or her case. Id. (“If witnesses die or disappear during a delay, the
prejudice is obvious. There is also prejudice if defense witnesses are unable to recall
accurately events of the distant past.”). This factor remains a consideration when
the court seeks to determine whether a defendant’s right to a speedy sentencing has
been violated. See Perez v. Sullivan, 793 F.2d 249, 253–54 (10th Cir. 1986) (citing
cases).
136
Cruz, 757 F.3d at 385.
137
Id. at 385–86.
138
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32 (discussing the factual circumstances that receive
consideration in sentencing).
139
Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 180 (2003).
140
See 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d) (2012) (allowing periodic review of a person’s
competency). The individual remains in treatment until the court finds that there is
a “substantial probability” he or she will regain competency in an additional amount
of time. Id.
134
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many years before a guilty person actually receives his or her
sentence.141 In the interim between conviction and sentencing,
the court does not sit idly by until the defendant is suddenly
ready to be sentenced.142 Instead, the court must actively use
judicial resources in order to monitor the defendant’s progress
and competency.143 Thus, the extra time between the close of
trial and sentencing proceeding requires the expenditure of extra
judicial resources. In addition, allowing too many years to go by
between a guilty conviction and a sentencing procedure might
result in courts being flooded with cases which may never come
to a close. These cases remain on the court’s docket, causing
congestion. Accordingly, the Government has an interest in
making sure judicial resources are used efficiently, and that
sentencing is completed within a reasonable time.
Second, the Government has an interest in completing the
criminal justice process and ensuring that the purposes of the
criminal justice system are being furthered.144 The criminal law
serves many purposes, and sentencing a defendant plays a
crucial role in furthering these purposes.145 For the Government,
the trial phase is only one part of the adjudicative process, and
determination of the defendant’s punishment is a critical part of
the criminal process.146 “Both the deterrent and retributive
purposes of the criminal law are better served . . . by quicker
resolutions, as expressed by the aphorism ‘justice delayed is
justice denied.’ ”147 The Wood court utilized this argument,
stating that the “sentencing phase of a criminal prosecution
is . . . a critical step in the criminal justice process that Congress

141

Id.
§ 4241(d)–(e) (describing the role of the court following a finding that the
defendant is incompetent to stand trial); FED. R. CRIM. P. 32 (describing the ordinary
role of the court after trial and before sentencing).
143
§ 4241(d).
144
2 JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 15.01 (4th ed. 2006).
145
Id.
146
Id.
147
Id. § 8.01; see also United States v. Petty, 982 F.2d 1365, 1371 (9th Cir. 1993)
(Noonan, J., dissenting) (“To deny that the sentencing process is part of a criminal
prosecution is to cut out the guts of criminal prosecution as it is conducted in our
courts.”).
142

FINAL_VIEBROCK

2016]

8/25/2016 12:01 PM

IMPORTANT IS NOT IMPORTANT ENOUGH

155

designed.”148 Thus, if the Government is unable to complete the
criminal justice process by punishing the criminal defendant,
then the purposes of the criminal justice system are not being
served.149
Third, the Government has a responsibility to conclude the
criminal justice process in order to protect the public.150 One of
the driving forces behind criminal punishment is to ensure that
the community feels safe, and sentencing defendants to the
proper punishment is one way of achieving this goal.151 The
Government “seeks to protect through application of the criminal
law the basic human need for security.”152 The Cruz court
highlighted this argument by suggesting that the Government’s
interest in securing the community does not end after the trial
phase of the criminal process, but instead carries over to the
sentencing phase of the process.153 Accordingly, the Government
has an interest in incapacitating the individual in order to
prevent further harm to society.154 Further, it may be argued
that incapacitation in a medical facility does not sufficiently
punish the individual or put the community at ease. Thus, if an
incompetent defendant is not forcibly medicated, and as a result
never receives his or her sentence, the community will experience
a sense of unrest that the criminal justice system is designed to
eliminate.
Fourth, the Government has an interest in enforcing the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984155 and the United States Federal
Sentencing Guidelines156 in order to ensure fairness and

148

United States v. Wood, 459 F. Supp. 2d 451, 459 (E.D. Va. 2006).
JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 2.01 (6th ed. 2012).
150
DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 144, § 15.01.
151
Id.
152
Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 180 (2003); see also DRESSLER, supra
note 149, § 2.03 (defining incapacitation as a goal of the criminal justice system).
153
United States v. Cruz, 757 F.3d 372, 384–85 (3rd Cir. 2014).
154
DRESSLER, supra note 149, § 2.03.
155
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3551 (2012).
156
28 U.S.C. §§ 991–998 (2012). The Guidelines were not implemented until
1987 and were not fully operational until 1989. John S. Martin, Jr., The Role of the
Departure Power in Reducing Injustice and Unwarranted Disparity Under the
Sentencing Guidelines, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 259, 259 (2000). The Guidelines
established an independent commission in the judicial branch. § 991(b). The purpose
of this commission is to ensure the purposes of the Sentencing Act are being fulfilled.
Id. This includes, providing certainty, fairness, and flexibility in sentencing. Id.
149
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uniformity in sentencing.157 As the Wood court observed, forcibly
medicating a defendant for sentencing is an important
governmental interest because “there is a very important,
legislatively articulated, governmental interest in achieving fair,
reasonable and non-disparate sentences for similarly situated
defendants who have engaged in similar conduct.”158 If the court
decides to provisionally sentence the defendant, then there is no
consideration for other similarly situated defendants who have
engaged in similar conduct because the statute requires the
defendant to serve out the maximum term authorized by the
statute as a default. 159 Thus, if the defendant is provisionally
sentenced, the presentence fact-finding procedures are
eliminated.160 Consequently, a formal sentencing would be more
effective in furthering the goals of the Sentencing Reform Act
and Sentencing Guidelines.
Fifth, the Government arguably has an important interest in
forcibly medicating a defendant for sentencing because the
person is no longer a pretrial detainee, but rather a convicted
criminal.161 In the trial context, the individual is innocent until
proven guilty and forcibly medicating this “innocent” person
could be less justified if it turns out that the defendant did not
actually commit the crime he or she is charged with.162 In such a
situation, the Government may have violated the defendant’s due

157
S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 38 (1984) (“These provisions introduce a totally new
and comprehensive sentencing system that is based upon a coherent philosophy.
They rely upon detailed guidelines for sentencing similarly situated offenders in
order to provide for a greater certainty and uniformity in sentencing.”).
158
United States v. Wood, 459 F. Supp. 2d 451, 459 (E.D. Va. 2006); see also
Cruz, 757 F.3d at 383.
159
18 U.S.C. § 4244(d) (2012).
160
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32 (describing the pre-sentence investigations and
findings of fact that typically take place before a sentencing). These procedures are
designed to contribute to a fair, reasonable, and nondisparate sentence. United
States v. Trevino, 556 F.2d 1265, 1270 (5th Cir. 1977) (“[A] presentence report serves
not as a prosecutorial tool but as an informative document for the guidance of the
court.”); United States v. Hogan, 489 F. Supp. 1035, 1037 (W.D. Wash. 1980) (“[T]he
primary function of the probation department in the preparation of a presentence
investigation report is to provide the sentencing judge with objective and accurate
information relating to the defendant.”).
161
Alan C. Michaels, Trial Rights at Sentencing, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1771, 1856
(2003) (“The notion would be that, once convicted of the crime, the defendant is not
entitled to special protection from the punishment for which that conviction makes
him eligible.”).
162
Id. at 1855–56.
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process rights without any benefits to society.163 By contrast, an
individual being sentenced has already been found guilty, so the
risk of violating an innocent person’s rights does not exist.164
Instead, the Government’s guaranteed purpose is to sentence a
convicted person rather than to bring a potentially innocent
person to trial.165
Overall, the Government undoubtedly has interests in
forcibly medicating a defendant for sentencing. As explored
supra, many of the Government’s interests in sentencing are
similar to those interests that the Government has in bringing a
defendant to trial.166 The Wood and Cruz courts held that the
Government’s interests in sentencing are of the same importance
as the Government’s interests in proceeding to trial.167 As a
result, those courts did not hesitate to hold that the first factor of
the Sell test was an appropriate burden for the Government to
have to meet when seeking to forcibly medicate a defendant for
sentencing. Those courts, however, did not engage in a complete
analysis of the differences between trial proceedings and
sentencing proceedings that might make the Government’s
interests less compelling.
IV. WHY FORCIBLY MEDICATING DEFENDANTS FOR TRIAL IS
DIFFERENT THAN SENTENCING
The function of a trial and the function of sentencing have
always been, and still are, distinct in the law. A trial is “[a]
formal judicial examination of evidence and determination of
legal claims in an adversary proceeding.”168
In contrast,
sentencing is “[t]he judicial determination of the penalty for a
crime.”169 As described by William Blackstone in the 1800s, “the
imposition of punishment was not considered part of the criminal
trial; rather, it constituted a separate phase of criminal

163

Id. at 1856–57.
Id. (“The convicted individual facing sentencing is, by definition, not
innocent. Retributive and utilitarian concerns about the high cost of punishing the
innocent (or risking doing so) might be deemed inapplicable.”).
165
Id.
166
See supra Part III.
167
United States v. Cruz, 757 F.3d 372, 384 (3rd Cir. 2014); United States v.
Wood, 459 F. Supp. 2d 451, 458 (E.D. Va. 2006).
168
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1735 (10th ed. 2014).
169
Id. at 1570.
164
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proceedings that followed the conclusion of the trial.”170
Additionally, early decisions of American courts support the
notion that trials are separate and distinct from sentencing.171
Even today, trial and sentencing are defined differently by the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.172 Each process is governed
by different rules and procedures, and the defendant is afforded
different rights at each stage.173 These two stages are treated
differently because they are distinct processes with different
goals in mind.174 This long history of distinction supports the
conclusion that the governmental interest in bringing a
defendant to trial is different than its interest in sentencing by
nature of the two processes and the goals achieved by each.
A.

The Government’s Interest in Sentencing Is Less than in Trial

There are many reasons why the Government’s interest in
forcibly medicating a defendant is lessened in a sentencing. The
first reason is that the Government’s interest is lessened by its
ability to provisionally sentence a defendant under
18 U.S.C. § 4244(d).175 The statute provides that a defendant
who is presently suffering from a mental disease or defect be
committed to a suitable facility for care or treatment instead of
being sentenced.176 The commitment constitutes a provisional
sentence to the maximum term authorized for the specific
offense.177 This provision was part of the Insanity Defense
Reform Act, which was enacted to provide uniform procedure for
delinquents suffering from mental disease or defect at the time of
trial, at sentencing or when he or she is set to be released.178
Specifically, the fact-finding procedures found in § 4244—
psychiatric exam, report to the court, hearing and judicial
finding—are aimed at formalizing the court procedures for such

170
United States v. Ray, 578 F.3d 184, 195 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing 4 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *368).
171
See id. at 195–96 (collecting cases).
172
Compare FED. R. CRIM. P. 23–31 (pertaining to trials), with FED. R. CRIM. P.
32 (governing post-trial procedures).
173
Michaels, supra note 161, at 1778; Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246
(1949).
174
See Michaels, supra note 161, at 1773 (citing Williams, 337 U.S. at 246).
175
18 U.S.C. § 4244(d) (2012); see supra note 3.
176
Id.
177
Id.
178
H.R. REP. NO. 81-1319, at 1 (1949).
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similarly situated accused persons.179
Consequently, a
provisional sentence under § 4244 can be a suitable alternative to
a formal sentence since it contains its own fact-finding
procedures,180 and aims to achieve the goal of uniformity stressed
by the Sentencing Reform Act and Sentencing Guidelines.181
In the past, courts have been reluctant to accept the
provisional sentencing statute as an acceptable alternative to
sentencing.182 Courts hesitate because the statute requires
commitment for the maximum term authorized for the offense,
and often this would result in the individual serving more time in
a facility than he or she would have had he or she received an
actual sentence.183 However, this Note does not argue that
provisional sentencing is always the best alternative for
defendants who refuse to take medication, but rather that as an
available option, it undermines the Government’s interest in
forcibly medicating a defendant purely to proceed with a formal
sentencing procedure.
In fact, the possibility of lengthy confinement in a facility
through a provisional sentence has, on occasion, led the
Government to concede that its interest was not great enough to
forcibly medicate the defendant.184 In United States v. PerezRubalcava,185 the defendant was found guilty of reentry following
deportation, but was found incompetent to withstand
sentencing.186 The defendant was then provisionally sentenced
under 18 U.S.C. § 4244(d) to twenty years in a suitable facility.187
179

Id.
The Wood court argued that a provisional sentence “shortcuts the factfinding
procedure . . . and arrives at an accurate sentence only by coincidence.” United
States v. Wood, 459 F. Supp. 2d 451, 459 (E.D. Va. 2006). While the fact-finding
procedures required under 18 U.S.C. § 4244 are different than the fact-finding
procedures that take place at a traditional sentencing, they still serve the purpose of
informing the judge of the best sentence for that defendant. H.R. REP. NO. 81-1319,
at 1.
181
S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 38 (1984).
182
United States v. Baldovinos, 434 F.3d 233, 242–43 (4th Cir. 2006); Wood, 459
F. Supp. 2d at 459.
183
Baldovinos, 434 F.3d at 242–43. There, the statutory maximum for the crime
defendant committed totaled forty years, which was four times more than the
sentence defendant had already received. Id.
184
United States v. Perez-Rubalcava, No. CR-03-20018-RMW, 2008 WL
4601024, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2008).
185
2008 WL 4601024.
186
Id.
187
Id. This was the maximum authorized sentence by law for the defendant’s
offense. Id.
180
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At that time, the Government did not seek to provisionally
sentence the defendant, reasoning that the defendant’s refusal to
take drugs voluntarily would result in lengthy confinement in a
suitable facility, and that this would “diminish the risks that
ordinarily attach to freeing without punishment one who has
committed a serious crime.”188 The Government conceded that
the purposes of criminal punishment would be met without
violating the defendant’s rights through forcible medication.189
Based on the Government’s position, the court declined to
involuntarily medicate the defendant, stating that the
Government’s interest did not seem to justify it.190 Four years
later, the Government sought to forcibly medicate the defendant
to restore his competency for sentencing.191 However, the court
denied the motion, finding that the first factor of the Sell test
was not met, and that the Government had already “in large part
obtained the deterrence and other goals of a criminal conviction
and sentence.”192
The court’s holding in Perez-Rubalcava suggests that the
ability of the court to provisionally sentence mentally ill
defendants seriously undermines the Government’s interest in
forcibly medicating defendants for sentencing.
Once the
Government has achieved the goals of criminal punishment
through a provisional sentence, it is hard to justify violating a
defendant’s rights just to formally sentence him or her.
Furthermore, courts should not hesitate to provisionally sentence
defendants because it might result in a lengthy confinement.
The provisional sentence statute requires the defendant be
committed for the maximum term authorized by the statute for
the crime.193 This is a legislatively approved sentence, which
furthers rehabilitative and incapacitation principles of criminal
punishment.
The second reason why the Government’s interest in forcibly
medicating a defendant is lessened in a sentencing is due to the
differences between purposes of criminal punishment achieved at
the trial stage and at the sentencing stage. Such differences

188
189
190
191
192
193

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *2.
18 U.S.C. § 4244(d) (2012).
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support the conclusion that the Government’s interest in
sentencing is not the same as in trial. One of the main purposes
of convicting and sentencing defendants is to create a sense of
security for the community.194 The community wants to know
that those who have committed crimes are punished for their
crimes and that society does not have to fear that person.195
Arguably, once the guilty conviction has been determined, the
criminal justice system has already worked to put the community
at ease. The community is now aware that this is someone who
will be punished for his or her crimes. Additionally, if the
convicted person is refusing medication and the court finds him
or her incompetent to proceed, then this person is going to be
placed in a suitable facility, again maintaining the safety of the
community.196 Accordingly, the guilty conviction, coupled with
the fact that anyone the Government is seeking to forcibly
medicate will be placed in a facility, is all the assurance that the
community needs to feel safe.197 Consequently, the Government
has already done its part in protecting the community by getting
the guilty verdict, and its actual interest in formally sentencing
the defendant has decreased.
Third, forcibly medicating a convicted individual is not
fulfilling the rehabilitative purpose of criminal punishment. By
forcibly medicating a defendant for sentencing, the Government
is only temporarily restoring competency and is not truly seeking
to “rehabilitate” the individual.198 Instead, the Government’s
goal in seeking to forcibly medicate the defendant is solely for the
194

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C) (2012).
S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 36 (1984).
196
18 U.S.C. § 4244(d) (2012). The distinction between a forensic psychiatric
facility and a prison is insignificant for punishment purposes. The defendant is still
being punished by being involuntarily held in a secure environment.
197
The forensic psychiatric facilities where incompetent defendants go when
they
are
provisionally
sentenced
are
maximum
security
facilities.
See
Kirby
Forensic
Psychiatric
Center,
OFF.
MENTAL
HEALTH,
https://www.omh.ny.gov/omhweb/facilities/krpc/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2016); Donna
Riemer, Creating Sanctuary: Reducing Violence in a Maximum Security
Forensic Psychiatric Hospital Unit, INT’L ASS’N FORENSIC NURSES,
http://www.forensicnurses.org/?page=302 (last visited Mar. 8, 2016) (discussing the
setting of a maximum security psychiatric facility).
198
This proposition is analogous to that discussed in cases which deal with
whether an inmate sentenced to death can be forcibly medicated in order to render
him or her competent to be executed. See Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018, 1036
(8th Cir. 2003) (Heaney, J., dissenting); Singleton v. State, 437 S.E.2d 53, 61 (S.C.
1993); State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 755 (La. 1992).
195
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purpose of restoring mental competency to proceed with
sentencing and punish the defendant.199 There is no guarantee
that after one instance of forcible medication, he or she will
continue to take medication. Rehabilitation would be better
served if the defendant were provisionally sentenced to a
treatment facility where the staff is well equipped to deal with
mentally ill individuals.200 Accordingly, if most of the goals of
criminal punishment can be met through the provisional
sentence, the governmental interest in sentencing the defendant
by violating important individual rights is reduced.
Fourth, the side effects of antipsychotic medication can have
a significant impact on a defendant’s right to be reasonably heard
While not a
at sentencing, also known as allocution.201
constitutionally protected right, “[t]he right to allocution is an
integral part of the sentencing process which if not fully afforded
to the defendant requires a reversal of the sentence imposed.”202
The purpose of allocution is to allow the defendant to be heard by
the judge when he or she makes the ultimate decision in regards
to sentencing.203 If a defendant does not want to be medicated for
sentencing, then forcibly medicating this person for the purpose
of sentencing interferes with his or her right to speak honestly
and openly to the judge at sentencing. In other words, the person
who appears before the judge filled with antipsychotic medication
is not the same person that committed the crime, and that person
has a right to be heard by the judge.

199
Singleton, 319 F.3d at 1036 (Heaney, J., dissenting) (“At the very least, the
setting of an execution date calls into question the State's true motivation for
administering the medication in the first instance.”); Perry, 610 So. 2d at 755
(concluding that Washington v. Harper “sets forth a due process standard . . . [which]
strongly implies that antipsychotic drugs absolutely may not be used as a tool for
punishment”).
200
See Riemer, supra note 197.
201
See generally FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i)(4)(A)(i) (stating the defendant must be
afforded the opportunity to be heard through his attorney before a sentence is
imposed).
202
United States v. Muniz, 1 F.3d 1018, 1025 (10th Cir. 1993).
203
FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i)(4)(A)(i); see also Kimberly A. Thomas, Beyond
Mitigation: Towards A Theory of Allocution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2641, 2655 (2007)
(discussing the theory of mitigation as the purpose behind allocution).
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Extending Sell Is Contrary to the Spirit of the Opinion

Finally, the spirit of the United States Supreme Court
decision, in Sell v. United States,204 suggests that it was not
meant to be extended to apply in the sentencing context. The
Sell Court was careful to emphasize that forcible medication
should be used in very rare circumstances.205 The question
presented before the Sell Court was whether a defendant can be
forcibly medicated to be rendered competent for trial.206 With
much consideration for the defendant’s rights, the Court
developed a four-part factors test to ensure that forcible
medication would only be used when it was absolutely necessary
and effective.207 To extend this holding to include situations
where the Government is seeking to forcibly medicate defendants
for sentencing without extra consideration of the defendant’s
rights and the interests at stake is a misapplication of Sell.208
In Baldovinos, the Fourth Circuit decided for the first time
that it would use the Sell principles to govern its analysis of
whether the defendant could be forcibly medicated for
sentencing.209
The court’s only consideration was whether
Harper or Sell should apply, and it ultimately decided to apply
the Sell test since the defendant was not dangerous.210 The
Baldovinos court failed to discuss the substantial difference
between the present case and Sell, which was that the
Government was not seeking to medicate the defendant for trial,
but for sentencing.211 As a result, the very first application of the
Sell test to the sentencing context was done without any
consideration for the differences between trial and sentencing.212
Thus, the Baldovinos court completely ignored the Sell Court’s
prudence in creating the factors test as a balancing mechanism
for the defendant’s rights and the Government’s interest in
proceeding with trial. It was not long before both the Wood and
Cruz courts used the Baldovinos extension of the Sell holding,
204

539 U.S. 166 (2003).
Sell, 539 U.S. at 180.
206
Id. at 169.
207
Id. at 180–81.
208
Pet. Reh’g En Banc and Panel Reh’g at 3, United States v. Cruz, 757 F.3d
372 (3rd Cir. 2014) (No. 13-4378).
209
United States v. Baldovinos, 434 F.3d 233, 241 (4th Cir. 2006).
210
Id. at 239–41.
211
See id. at 240–41.
212
See id.
205
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again without consideration of the implied narrowness of the
decision.213 Accordingly, the extension of the Sell holding without
careful consideration of the Supreme Court’s warning that
forcible medication should be used in “rare circumstances” was a
misapplication of the decision.
Furthermore, the Sell Court’s emphasis on the pre-trial
nature of the proceedings suggests that the Government’s
interest in forcibly medicating a defendant for sentencing should
be treated differently.214 While there are still concerns about
memories fading and lost evidence, the need for immediacy at
sentencing is not as great as in trial.215 This is because before
trial there is a significant risk of prejudice to the defendant while
This prejudice includes, “public scorn,
he awaits trial.216
deprivation of employment, disruption of family life, and the
detrimental impact on the individual when jailed awaiting
trial.”217 However, many of these interests disappear after a
conviction, since the individual is now a convicted person and not
a potentially innocent pretrial detainee.218 Similarly, the stated
interest of minimizing anxiety and concern before trial219 is less
compelling since the anxiety that an accused person experiences
“is not to be equated for constitutional purposes with anxiety
suffered by one who is convicted, in jail, unquestionably going to
serve a sentence, and only waiting to learn how long that
sentence will be.”220 These different concerns suggest that there
are reasons to treat the two processes differently.
Finally, while there is still concern for memories fading and
lost evidence, there are other important evidentiary concerns for
the incompetent defendant at sentencing. Formal sentencing
procedures heavily rely on a collection of all relevant facts about
the defendant, which contribute to a fair sentence.221 The
defendant who is deemed incompetent to be sentenced is not
213
United States v. Wood, 459 F. Supp. 2d 451, 456–61 (E.D. Va. 2006); United
States v. Cruz, 757 F.3d 372, 381–89 (3rd Cir. 2014).
214
Sell v. United States. 539 U.S. 166, 180 (2003) (“[I]t may be difficult or
impossible to try a defendant who regains competence after years of commitment
during which memories may fade and evidence may be lost.”).
215
Perez v. Sullivan, 793 F.2d 249, 256 (10th Cir. 1986).
216
Id.
217
Id.
218
Id.
219
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532 (1972).
220
Perez, 793 F.2d at 257.
221
FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)–(d).
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ready to be sentenced, and as a result, the evidence needed to
sentence this defendant is not ready yet either.222 Thus, instead
of being concerned about the fading memories and lost evidence,
the court should be concerned with undeveloped evidence when it
seeks to sentence an incompetent defendant.
V.

A CALL FOR A HEIGHTENED STANDARD FOR THE GOVERNMENT

The differences between trial and sentencing, along with the
spirit of the Sell decision, should have resulted in a more indepth analysis by the Wood and Cruz courts when they held that
the Government may have an important interest in forcibly
medicating a defendant for sentencing. While the Cruz and
Wood courts did consider some of the implications, they did not
reach the proper conclusion.
The differences between trial and sentencing and the nature
of the Sell holding lead to the conclusion that the Government
should have to meet a higher burden when seeking to forcibly
medicate a defendant for sentencing. Thus, in the sentencing
context, the first Sell factor should be changed to require that the
Government demonstrate a compelling interest in forcibly
medicating the defendant for sentencing. A compelling interest
standard would acknowledge that there are differences between
trial and sentencing, and thus would more appropriately balance
the interests of the Government and those of the defendant.
Furthermore, raising the standard based on these differences
would help to maintain the spirit of the Sell decision. With the
compelling interest standard, there is still the possibility that
defendants can be forcibly medicated for sentencing, but it will
only occur in the rarest and most appropriate circumstances. For
these reasons, the first factor of the Sell test should be changed
from requiring an important interest to requiring a compelling
interest when the Government seeks to forcibly administer
medication to a defendant for the purpose of rendering him or
her competent to withstand sentencing.
As a practical matter, there is no exact formula for what
constitutes a compelling government interest. Some factors that
might contribute to a finding of a compelling interest include
222
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 264–65 (2005) (arguing that the
features of the remaining Sentencing Guideline “continue to move sentencing in
Congress' preferred direction, helping to avoid excessive sentencing disparities while
maintaining flexibility sufficient to individualize sentences where necessary”).
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exceptionally complex factual findings at trial, the nature and
extent of the defendant’s crimes and the defendant’s effect on
society, whether a provisional sentence, as opposed to a formal
sentence, would result in an extremely disparate sentence for the
defendant, and where the defendant is likely to serve time if
formally sentenced.
Take, for example, the hypothetical defendant Jack.
Imagine Jack was involved in an ongoing conspiracy scheme to
defraud the Government. The trial went on for many months
because the testimony was endless, and the court’s opinion spent
twenty pages discussing the findings of fact. Also, imagine that
the maximum term authorized by the statute is twenty years in
prison, but that Jack’s co-conspirators are each receiving five
years. Additionally, if formally sentenced, Jack is likely to be
placed in a secure and suitable medical facility where he can
continue to receive treatment. The Government may have a
compelling interest in forcibly medicating Jack since there are
compelling concerns about keeping the complex factual evidence
fresh. There is a big difference between the provisional sentence
Jack would receive and the actual sentence he would receive, and
Jack is likely to get the rehabilitative help he needs if formally
sentenced.
Now imagine, instead, Jack conspires to commit an armed
robbery. The facts of the case are not that complicated, and the
trial takes two days to complete. Imagine the maximum term
authorized by the statute is eight years, and that Jack’s coconspirators each receive six years in prison. If Jack is formally
sentenced, he is likely to serve out his sentence in a federal
prison. Here, the Government’s interest is not compelling
because there are no significant evidentiary concerns, the
sentence Jack would receive provisionally is not so disparate as
to justify violating individual rights, and Jack would receive
better rehabilitative care through treatment in a suitable facility
than in a federal prison.
CONCLUSION
Though the Sell test is an appropriate test to balance the
interests of the defendant and the Government when seeking to
forcibly medicate a defendant for trial, it is not appropriate in the
sentencing context. Trials and sentencing have always been
distinct from one another and there are reasons for the
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distinction. As this Note argues, there are more important
interests at stake for the Government in the trial phase than in
sentencing, which involve both the principles and procedures of
criminal punishment.
Furthermore, an extension of the
important interest standard to the sentencing context without
extra consideration of individual liberties and governmental
interests is contrary to the spirit of the United States Supreme
Court decision in Sell. Accordingly, the first factor of the Sell
test as applied in the sentencing context should require the
Government to prove a compelling interest in order to account for
the differences between trial and sentencing and to preserve the
essence of Sell.

